Module 3

Phase 1

The War in Iberia

  After 217 BC, Publius Cornelius Scipio traveled to Iberia.  In early 215 BCE, the Romans crossed the Ebro River in force and laid siege to Ibera, a small Iberian town allied to Carthage. Leaving Himilco in charge at New Carthage (Cartagena), Hasdrubal Barca marched north with his field army to the Ebro. 

Hasdrubal Barca Coin

  However, he chose not to cross the Ebro to raid the Roman possessions, nor did he attack the Roman army besieging Ibera. Instead, the Carthaginian army besieged a town allied with the Romans called Dertosa. The Scipios lifted their siege and moved to engage Hasdrubal. Thus, Hasdrubal had gained the strategic initiative: He had aided his allies by forcing the Romans to lift their siege and face the Carthaginian army on a site of his own choosing. The opposing armies encamped on a plain between Ibera and Dertosa within five miles of each other. After five days of skirmishing, the commanders drew out their armies for battle.

   The Roman infantry consisted of two Roman legions, with 10,000 soldiers, and 18,000 allied Italian troops. The cavalry comprised 600 Roman and 1,800 Italian heavy horse. The Romans also recruited an auxiliary force of 2,000 Iberian foot and 400 heavy horse.

  Hasdrubal had 15,000 Libyan spearmen, 1,000 mercenaries (mostly Ligurians from Italy) and 8,000 Iberian troops for his infantry. The Carthaginian cavalry comprised 450 Libyan/Punic and 1,200 Iberian heavy horse and 2,300 Numidian light horse. The Carthaginian army also had 20 elephants and 1,000 Balearic slingers.

  The Romans posted their troops in their traditional manner, with the cavalry on the wings and the infantry in the center. The combined Roman and Iberian horse he placed on the right wing, with the allied Roman horse on the left wing. The infantry line had the Roman allied troops on the wings next to the cavalry, and the Roman legions occupied the center. The Iberian infantry and 2,000 Roman/Italian troops guarded the Roman camp.

  Hasdrubal placed the Libyan and Iberian horse on his left wing facing the Roman/Iberian horse, and the Numidian light horse on his right wing facing the allied Italian horsemen. Next to the two cavalry contingents, in both cases facing the Italian foot, Hasdrubal placed a phalanx of Libyan infantry, backed up by mercenaries. In the center was the Carthaginian infantry line. Between the Libyan infantry phalanxes facing the Roman legions, was a thinned out line of Iberian infantry. The elephants were placed in front of the cavalry divided into two groups of 10 each on both of the wings. The Balearic slingers formed a skirmish line in front of the infantry. Two to three thousand troops guarded the Carthaginian camp.

  The Libyans and mercenaries placed on the flanks of the hard-pressed Iberians charged the Italian infantry opposite them and, despite their advantage in numbers (16,000 against 18,000), the Italians counter-attacked. However, the Libyans did not outflank the Romans. The Carthaginian cavalry placed on the wings, on the flank of the Libyans, closed with the Roman and Italian equestrians opposite them. Despite having the advantage in numbers on both wings (1,600 Libyan/Punic and Iberians faced 1,000 Roman/Spaniards on the left of the Carthaginian line and 2,300 Numidians faced 1,800 Italian horsemen on the right of the Carthaginian line), the Carthaginian horsemen were unable to drive the Romans from the battlefield. An indecisive skirmish developed on both wings of the armies between the opposing cavalry, with neither side gaining any advantage. At this point, the Iberian infantry forming the Carthaginian center collapsed, and began to flee the battle.  The Carthaginian cavalry, seeing their infantry center break and run, broke off their skirmishing with their Roman counterparts and fled the battlefield. The Roman infantry, after scattering the Iberians, returned to help the Italian infantry. The Libyan infantry managed to put up a hard resistance, inflicting and suffering heavy casualties before being overrun.

  Hasdrubal survived the battle with most of his elephants and cavalry, and a few infantry (mostly Iberians). The Roman pursuit was not vigorous enough to destroy the retreating Carthaginian forces. The Romans managed to storm the Carthaginian camp, after Hasdrubal had hastily evacuated his soldiers. The provisions and booty fell into the hands of the victorious Romans. The shattered Carthaginian army retired to New Carthage (Cartagena), leaving the Romans firmly established south of the Ebro.

  To keep the Romans in check and keep the Carthaginian possessions in Iberia under control, armies under Mago Barca and Hasdrubal Gisco would reinforce Hasdrubal from Carthage.  The Scipio brothers did not mount a vigorous pursuit or an immediate campaign against the Carthaginians immediately after their victory. They chose to follow their strategy of mounting raids, instigating Iberian tribes to rebel, and building up their power base.  They would fight the Barca brothers and Gisco with varying results until 212 BCE, when they launched a major campaign leading to the Battle of the Upper Baetis.

  Hasdrubal had tried to imitate the tactics used by Hannibal at Cannae. While Hannibal had brought about a spectacular victory, Hasdrubal had suffered a shattering defeat.  The complex cavalry moves needed at Dertosa wasn't orchestrated with flawless efficiency because his troops and commanders in the field did not have the training and experience that Hannibal’s soldiers had.  Hasdrubal only had a slight advantage in numbers of cavalry at Dertosa.  Nevertheless, he failed to take any advantage or devise any formation to gain the upper hand during the battle.  Personal initiative by commanders can often determine the outcome of a battle.

    Although the Battle of Dertosa had a critical influence on the strategic course of the war.  Had Hasdrubal won the battle, there would have been at least four Carthaginian armies operating in Italy by 214 BCE.  The cornerstone of the strategy that Hamilcar Barca had planned depended on the undisputed Barcid control of Iberia and the ability to draw workers and wealth from it. This defeat caused Carthage to send Mago Barca to Iberia, along with Hasdrubal Gisco, a political rival of the Barcids. It seems that a different noble family sent each and thus each had a separate objective.  This ended the Barcid domination there, and had far-reaching consequences. The Romans gained the initiative in Iberia, which caused a drain of resources better employed elsewhere. Consequently, Mago went to Iberia with the reinforcements meant for Hannibal.

  Although Hannibal would receive 4,000 Numidian Horse and 40 elephants in 215 BCE (probably by land), these were pitiful compared to reinforcements sent to other locations. In short, the defeat at Dertosa took away most of the political capital Hannibal had won for Carthage through his victory at Cannae.

  Gnaeus and Publius Scipio are given credit with the fortification of Tarraco and the establishment of a military port. The city wall re-built over the front of an ancient wall; with the marks of the Iberian stonemason are in evidence, indicating it was done by hand.  In 216 BCE Gnaeus and Publius Scipio fought the Iberians, probably against tribes south of the Ebro. The Iberian attacks were repelled.

  While  hardly any further action took place in the Iberian theatre after this point in time, the Scipios were able to negotiate a new front in Africa by allying themselves with Syphax, a powerful Numidian king in North Africa. In 213 BCE he received Roman advisers to train his heavy infantry soldiers that had not yet been able to stand up to their Carthaginian counterparts… 

Syphax The Numidian King

Meanwhile, two armies, led respectively by his younger brother, Mago Barca, and Hasdrubal Gisco, had reinforced Hasdrubal.   Hasdrubal Gisco was the son of the Gesco who had served together with Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal's father, in Sicily during the First Punic War and son-in-law of Hanno the Elder who was one of Hannibal's lieutenants in Italy.  These armies fought several indecisive battles with the Scipio brothers between 215-211 BCE. Since the Scipios had persuaded Syphax, a Numidian king, to open hostilities against Carthage with a Roman trained army in 213 BC.  The situation in Iberia was stable enough for Hasdrubal Barca to shift his attention to Africa in 213/212 BCE in order to put down this rebellion. Therefore, he left Iberia and went to Africa to put down the revolt of Syphax.

  Before this battle the brothers had spent seven years (218 BCE - 211 BCE) campaigning in Hispania, which had limited the resources available to Hannibal, who was simultaneously 

fighting the Romans in Italy.  After the defeat of Hasdrubal Barca in the Battle of Dertosa in the spring of 215 BCE the Romans had secured their bases north of the Ebro. The Romans proceeded to win over some Iberian tribes, raid Carthaginian lands south of the Ebro, with Publius Scipio raiding as far as Saguntum in 214 BCE. Both the Romans and Carthaginians faced and put down Iberian tribal revolts. The Scipios received no reinforcement from Italy, where Hannibal Barca had the Romans hard pressed.

  Hasdrubal Barca returned to Iberia in late 212 BCE, bringing with him 3,000 Numidians under Masinissa, the future king of Numidia.

Masinissa The Numidian King

  The Scipio brothers had hired 20,000 Celt-Iberian mercenaries to reinforce their army of 30,000 foot and 3,000 horses. Observing that the Carthaginian armies were deployed separately from each other each with a separate area to defend (Hasdrubal Barca had 15,000 troops near Amorgos; and, further to the west, Mago Barca and Hasdrubal Gisco, each had 10,000 troops), the Scipio brothers decided to divide their forces. Publius Scipio led 20,000 Roman and allied soldiers to attack Mago Barca near Castulo, while Gnaeus Scipio took one double legion (10,000 troops) and the mercenaries to attack Hasdrubal Barca. This stratagem would lead to two battles, the Battle of Castulo and the Battle of Ilorca, which took place within a few days of each other, usually combined as the Battle of the Upper Baetis (211 BCE). 

Ruins of Castulo

  Gnaeus Scipio arrived at his objective first. However, Hasdrubal Barca had already ordered the armies of Indibilis and Mandonius (Iberian chieftains friendly to the Carthaginians) and Hasdrubal Gisco to join Mago near Castulo. Hasdrubal Barca held his ground against Gnaeus Scipio, staying within his fortified camp, then managed to bribe the Celt-Iberian mercenaries to desert Gnaeus Scipio. This led to Hasdrubal's army outnumbering that of Gnaeus Scipio. Hasdrubal bided his time, avoiding any battles with the Romans.

  As Publius Scipio neared Castulo, the Numidian light cavalry under Masinissa harassed him day and night. When informed that Indibilis was moving across his line of retreat with 7,500 Iberians, Publius Scipio decided not to face Mago but to attack the Iberian chieftain, fearing that Carthaginian forces would surround him. Leaving 2,000 soldiers in his camp under the legate Tiberius Fonteus, he marched out that night to launch an attack on the Iberians and, evade Masinissa’s cavalry. Scipio marched throughout the night caught Indibilis and his men by surprise in the early morning; and, with an 18,000 to 7,500 advantage, began to gain the upper hand in the ensuing action. However, the Iberians managed to hold off the Romans in the confused night battle just long enough for Masinissa to arrive.  With the Numidian horse attacking from the flank, the Roman assault on the Iberians began to slacken. When Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco arrived with their combined armies, the Romans finally, after a grim struggle, broke and fled, leaving Publius Scipio and most of their comrades dead on the field.  Mago gave the Numidians enough time to loot the dead before force-marching the army towards Hasdrubal Barca's position. A handful of Roman survivors managed to reach their camp.   Gnaeus Scipio had lost the advantage of numbers with the desertion of the mercenaries. Although unaware of Publius Scipio's fate, Gnaeus decided to withdraw towards northern Iberia after Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco arrived with their armies. The Romans moved out of their camp, leaving their campfires burning, and headed for Ebro at night. The Numidians located them the following day; their attacks forced the Romans to take position for the night on a hilltop near Ilorca. The main Carthaginian army, which now comprised the forces of Hasdrubal Barca, Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago, arrived during the night. In desperation, the Romans tried to create a defensive wall with baggage and saddles, as the ground was too stony for digging. The Carthaginians easily overran this, and Gnaeus was killed in the fighting; his army destroyed. Carthage gained the territory up to the Ebro River because of this victory.   The Roman fugitives fled north of the Ebro, where they eventually gathered a hodge-podge army of 8,000 soldiers. 

  The Carthaginian commanders made no coordinated attempts to wipe out these survivors and then send help to Hannibal Barca.  The Carthaginians would come to regret their inaction of not wiping out these Roman remnants.   In late 211 BCE, Rome sent another 10,000 troops under Claudius Nero to reinforce its forces in Iberia. Nero scored no spectacular victories and  did not launch a coordinated assault on the Carthaginians in Iberia at that time.