Phase 7

The Fall of Carthage

The Third Punic War (Latin: Tertium Bellum Punicum) was the third and last of the Punic Wars fought between the former Phoenician colony of Carthage and the Roman Republic. 

  The peace treaty at the end of the Second Punic War required that all border disputes involving Carthage were to be arbitrated by the Roman Senate and required Carthage to get explicit Roman approval before going to war. As a result, in the 50 intervening years between the Second and Third Punic War, Carthage had to take all border disputes with Rome's ally Numidia to the Roman Senate, where they were decided almost exclusively in Numidian favor.

  In 151 BCE, the Carthaginians considered that their debt to Rome was paid, meaning that, in Punic eyes, the treaty was now expired. (French, Peter (2010). War and Moral Dissonance) But not so according to the Romans, who instead viewed the treaty as a permanent declaration of Carthaginian subordination to Rome akin to the Roman treaties with its Italian allies. Moreover, the retirement of the indemnity removed one of the main incentives the Romans had to keep the peace with Carthage – there were no further payments to be made.  

Farmland of Ancient Carthage

 The Romans had other reasons to conquer Carthage and her remaining territories ("The Histories". Fordham University).   By the middle of the 2nd century BCE, the population of the city of Rome was about 400,000 and rising. Feeding the growing populace was becoming a major challenge. The farmlands surrounding Carthage represented the most productive, most accessible and perhaps the most easily obtainable agricultural lands not yet under Roman control. (Appian's History of Rome: The Punic Wars §§66-70)
  In 151 BCE Numidia launched another border raid on Carthaginian soil, besieging the Punic town of Oroscopa, and Carthage launched a large military expedition (25,000 soldiers) to repel the Numidian invaders. As a result, Carthage suffered a military defeat and had to pay another fifty-year debt to Numidia. Immediately thereafter, however, Rome showed displeasure with Carthage’s decision to wage war against its neighbor without Roman consent, and told Carthage that in order to avoid a war it had to “satisfy the Roman People.”
  In 149 BCE, Rome declared war against Carthage. The Carthaginians attempted to appease Rome, and received a promise that if three hundred children of well-born Carthaginians were sent as hostages to Rome the Carthaginians would keep the rights to their land and self-government., At Utica now a ally of Rome a Roman army of 80,000 men gathered there ( Scullard, Howard Hayes: A History of the Roman World, 753 to 146 BCE).   The consuls then demanded that Carthage hand over all weapons and amour. After they were handed over, Rome additionally demanded that the Carthaginians move at least sixteen kilometers inland, while the city itself to be burned the ground.  When the Carthaginians learned of this, they abandoned negotiations. The Romans attacked and put the city under siege, officially beginning the Third Punic War.

Fortress of the City of Carthage

  After the main Roman expedition landed at Utica, the consuls Manius Manilius and Lucius Marcius Censorius launched a two-pronged attack on Carthage. The army of the Carthaginian Generals Hasdrubal the Boeotarch and Himilco Phameas repulsed them.

  

The Consul Manius Manilius

History does not record much about Hasdrubal the Boeotarch.  Boeotarch is a Carthaginian office, the exact function of which is unclear; it is not the same with the Greek office of the same name. Manilius lost more than 500 men to the Carthaginian cavalry while collecting timber around the Lake of Tunis which surprised them. (Appian, Punica 97-99)

Map of Lake Tunis and Carthage

 A worse disaster fell upon the Romans when their fleet was set ablaze by fire ships which the Carthaginians released upwind (Appian, Punica 99). 

Fire ships sent to set the Roman fleet afire

  Consul Calpurnius Piso replaced Manilius in 149 BCE, after a severe defeat of the Roman army at Nepheris, a Carthaginian stronghold south of the city. In 148 BCE, Piso was defeated while attempting to storm the city of Aspis, near Cape Bon.  Undeterred, he laid siege to the town of Hippo Greta (modern Bizerte, the modern capitol of Tunisia) in the north, but his army was unable to defeat the Punic army there before winter and he had to retreat.

The Consul Calpurnius Piso 

  When the news reached Rome of Piso’s setbacks, the senate elected another consul to take his place. The Romans elected the young but popular Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus as consul, a special law being passed to lift the age restriction. Scipio restored discipline, defeated the Carthaginians at Nepheris, and besieged the city closely, constructing a mole to block the harbor. Scipio Aemilianus's intervention saved four cohorts trapped in a ravine (Appian, Punica 102-105).  Nepheris fell to Scipio in the winter of 147-146 BCE (Appian, Punica 126-130).   

Scipio’s advance on Nepheris

  

The Carthaginians manned the walls of Carthage and defied the Romans, a situation that lasted for two years. In this period, the 500,000 Carthaginians inside the walls transformed the city into a huge arsenal. They produced about 300 swords, 500 spears, 140 shields and 1,000 projectiles for catapults daily (Appian of Alexandria, The Punic Wars, "The Third Punic War").  

Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus was the grandson of Cornelius Scipio Africanus

  In spring 146 BCE, the Romans broke through the city walls of Carthage, but they were hard-pressed to take the city. Every building, house and temple became a stronghold and every Carthaginian had taken up a weapon. They were inevitably gradually pushed back by the overwhelming Roman military force and destroyed. The Romans methodically moved slowly, capturing the city house-by-house, street by street and fighting each Carthaginian soldier who fought with courage born of despair. 

The Battle of Carthage

Eventually after hours upon hours of house-to-house fighting, the Carthaginians surrendered.    Many Carthaginians died from starvation during the later part of the siege, while many others died in the final six days of fighting. An estimated 50,000 surviving inhabitants were sold into slavery. The city was then set afire and leveled. 

Carthage set Afire and Burning

 Before the end of the battle, a dramatic event took place: 900 survivors, most of them Roman deserters, had found refuge in the temple of Eshmun, in the citadel of Byrsa, although it was already burning.  The land surrounding Carthage was eventually declared ager publicus (public land), and it was shared between local farmers, Romans, and Italians.

The Ruins of Byrsa

 The Carthaginians negotiated their surrender, but Scipio Aemilianus expressed that forgiveness was impossible either for Hasdrubal, the general who defended the city, or for the defectors. Hasdrubal then left the Citadel to surrender and pray for mercy, (he had tortured Roman prisoners in front of the Roman army (Appian, Punica 118)). At that moment, Hasdrubal's wife allegedly went out with her two children, insulted her husband, sacrificed her sons and jumped with them into a fire that the deserters had started. The deserters too then hurled themselves into the flames, (Appian of Alexandria The Punic Wars, "The Third Punic War") upon which Scipio Aemilianus began weeping. . He recited a sentence from Homer's Iliad, (Homer: Iliad; book 6) a prophecy about the destruction of Troy, that could be applied now to Carthage's end. Scipio declared that the fate of Carthage might one day be Rome's (Polybius: Histories, Book XXXVIII).  In the words of Polybius:

  “Scipio, when he looked upon the city as it was utterly perishing and in the last throes of its complete destruction, is said to have shed tears and wept openly for his enemies. After being wrapped in thought for long, and realizing that all cities, nations, and authorities must, like men, meet their doom: recollecting that this happened to Ilium, once a prosperous city.  To the empires of Assyria, Media, and Persia, the greatest of their time, and to Macedonia itself, the brilliance of which was so recent, deliberated on the verses escaping him, he said:

“A day will come when sacred Troy shall perish,

In addition, Priam and his people shall be slain.

In addition, when Polybius speaking with freedom to him, for he was his teacher, asked him what he meant by the words, they say that without any attempt at concealment he named his own country, for which he feared when he reflected on the fate of all things human. Polybius actually heard him and recalls it in his history (Polybius XXXVIII, 5 The Fall of Carthage).”

  Carthage was systematically burned for 17 days; the city's walls and buildings were destroyed. The remaining Carthaginian territories became the Roman province of Africa.  Utica the Punic City that switched loyalties at the beginning of this War became the capitol of the Roman Province of Africa.

The Remains of Roman Utica 

Exit Last Historical Module and Phase

Phase 6

The Beginning of the End

  The end of the war did not meet with a universal approval in Rome, for reasons of both politics and fear. Rome on the other hand by this victory, had taken steps towards what ultimately becomes her domination of the Mediterranean world.   The Senate decreed upon a peace treaty with Carthage. Quintus Caecilius Metellus, a former consul, said he did not look upon the termination of the war as a blessing to Rome. Because he feared that the Roman people would now sink back again into its former slumbers, from which it had awoke by the presence of Hannibal (Valerius Maximus vii. 2. §3).  Others, most notably Cato the Elder, feared that if Carthage continued to exist, it would soon regain its power and pose new threats to Rome he pressed for harsher peace-conditions.

Cato the Elder

 Even after the peace, Cato insisted on the destruction of Carthage, ending all his speeches with "Carthage must be destroyed", even if the speech had nothing to do with Carthage (Plutarch, Life of Cato).

  Archeology has discovered that the famous circular military harbour at Carthage, the Cothon, received a significant buildup during or after the Second Punic War. Though shielded from external sight, it could house and quickly deploy about 200 triremes.

Scale Model of the Cothon in Carthage

This appears a surprising development as, after the war, one of the terms of surrender restricted the Carthaginian fleet to only ten triremes. One possible explanation: as has been pointed out for other Phoenician cities, privateers with warships played a significant role besides trade, even after the Roman Empire officially controlled all the coasts. In this case, it is not clear whether the treaty included private warships. The only reference to Punic privateers comes from the First Punic War: one such privateer, Hanno the Rhodian, owned a quinquereme (which was faster than the serial production models that the Romans had copied), manned with about 500 men and then among the heaviest warships in use.

Hanno the Rhodian’s Quinquereme

 Later pirates in Roman waters all used  much smaller vessels, which could outrun naval vessels, but operated with lower personnel costs. Thus, piracy very common in Carthage and the state did not have a monopoly of military forces. Pirates probably played an important role in capturing slaves, one of the most profitable trade-goods, but merchant ships with tradable goods and a crew were also their targets. No surviving source reports the fate of Punic privateers in the periods between and after the Punic Wars.

  Hannibal ended his military career at Carthage.  He became a businessperson for several years and later enjoyed a leadership role in Carthage.   Hannibal was still only 43 and soon showed that he could be a political leader as well as a soldier. Following the conclusion of a peace that left Carthage stripped of its formerly mighty empire, Hannibal prepared to take a back seat for a time. However, the blatant corruption of the oligarchy gave Hannibal a chance to re-emerge after he was elected as suffete or chief magistrate. The office had become rather insignificant, but Hannibal restored its power and authority. The oligarchy, always jealous of him, had even charged him with having betrayed the interests of his country while in Italy, for neglecting to take Rome when he might have done so.

Hannibal Barca

 So effectively did Hannibal reform abuses that the heavy tribute imposed by Rome was paid by installments without additional and extraordinary taxation. He also reformed the Hundred and Four, stipulating that its membership be determined by direct election rather than co-option. He also used citizen support to change the term of office in the Hundred and Four from life to a year, with a term limit of two years.  While in power, Hannibal had promoted agriculture in Carthage.  Carthage developed a highly advanced production in agriculture by using iron ploughs, irrigation, and crop rotation.  Hannibal promoted agriculture because it would help restore Carthage’s economy and pay the war indemnity to Rome (10,000 talents or 800,000 pounds in silver) and he was highly successful.  Circumstantial evidence suggests that Carthage had developed the science of wine making before the 4th Century BCE and even exported wines widely, as indicated by distinct cigar-shaped Carthaginian amphorae found at agricultural sites around the western Mediterranean. 

Carthaginian Amphora

Fruits including figs, pears, pomegranates, as well as nuts, grain, dates and olives where grown in the extensive hinterland.  Carthage also bred fine horses, the ancestors of today’s Barb horses.

A Barb Horse

  A period of peace existed between the two empires for a space of about 50 years (201-149 BCE). During that time, Rome was engaged in the conquest of the Hellenistic empire-of the east, the Macedonian Wars, the Illyrian Wars, and the Roman-Syrian Wars, while ruthlessly suppressing the Hispanic people in the west.

  However, the Carthaginian nobility, upset by Hannibal’s policy of democratization and his struggle against corruption, persuaded the Romans to force him into exile in Asia Minor, where he again led armies against the Romans and their allies on the battlefield. This was their big mistake.  Had they united under Hannibal their empire might have continued for a longer time.  Therefore, seven years after the victory of Zama, the Romans, alarmed by Carthage's renewed prosperity, demanded Hannibal's surrender.  The Carthaginian nobility had arranged all of this.   Hannibal thereupon went into voluntary exile. He journeyed to Tyre, the mother city of Carthage possibly to visit the shrine of their god there, and then to Ephesus, where he was honorably received by Antiochus III of Syria, who was preparing for war with Rome.

Votive Statues of Melqart the god of Tyre and Carthage

  Hannibal soon saw that the king's army was no match for the Romans. He advised equipping a fleet and landing a body of troops in the south of Italy, offering to take command himself. Nevertheless, he could not make much impression on Antiochus, who listened to his courtiers and would not entrust Hannibal with any important office.  According to Cicero, while at the court of Antiochus, Hannibal attended a lecture by Phormio, a philosopher that ranged through many topics. After Phormio finished his discourse on the duties of a general.  When the discourse was over Hannibal was asked for his opinion. He replied, "I have seen during my life many old fools; but this one beats them all." Another story according to Aulus Gellius is that when Antiochus III showed off the gigantic and elaborately equipped army he had created to invade Greece to Hannibal, he asked him if they would be enough for the Roman Republic. To which Hannibal replied, “I think all this will be enough, yes, quite enough, for the Romans, even though they are most avaricious” (Aulus Gellius. "Noctes Atticae". Book V. v. 5.).   In 191 BCE the Romans under Manius Acilius Glabrio routed Antiochus at Thermopylae and obliged him to withdraw to Asia. The Romans followed up their success by attacking Antiochus in Anatolia, and the Seleucids were decisively defeated at Magnesia and Sipylum in 190 BCE by Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus and his brother.

  In 190 BCE, Hannibal was given command of a Seleucid fleet, but was defeated in a battle off the Eurymedon River. According to Strabo and Plutarch, Hannibal also received hospitality at the Armenian court of Artaxias I. When Antiochus seemed prepared to surrender him to the Romans, Hannibal fled to Crete, but he soon went back to Asia Minor and sought refuge with Prusias I of Bithynia, who was engaged in warfare with Rome's ally, King Eumenes II of Pergamon. Hannibal went on to serve Prusias I in this war. He won at least one naval victory over Eumenes (Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal 10 and 11).   Hannibal also went on to defeat Eumenes in two other battles on land until the Romans interfered and threatened Bithynia into giving up Hannibal (Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal 12).   Hannibal also visited Tyre again once again to visit the shrine of Carthage‘s god, and the home of his forefathers. However the Romans were determined to hunt him down, and they insisted on his surrender.  In the end, Prusias agreed to give him up, but Hannibal was determined not to fall into his enemies' hands. At Libyssa (modern Gabze, Turkey) on the eastern shore of the Sea of Marmara (an inland sea in Turkey about 30 miles away), he took poison, which, it was said, he had long carried about with him in a ring (Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal 12.5; Juvenal, Satires X).  The precise year of Hannibal's death is unknown, but it was sometime between 183-181 BCE (Cornelius Nepos, Hannibal 13.1). 

Location of the Sea Of Marmara

  Cornelius Scipio Africanus was welcomed back to Rome in triumph with the military title of Africanus or Victor of Africa.. He refused the many further honours, which the people would have thrust upon him such as Consul for life and Dictator. In the year 199 BCE, Scipio was elected Censor but only served a short time.  After that and for years afterwards, he lived quietly and took no part in politics.  In 193 BCE, Cornelius Scipio Africanus was one of the commissioners sent to Africa to settle a dispute between Massinissa (the Numidians) and the Carthaginians, which the commission did not achieve. They did this intentionally as if to appear neutral but actually were on Masinissa’s side.  This was probably done because Hannibal, in the service of Antiochus III of Syria, might have come to Carthage to gather support for a new attack on Italy. In 190 BCE, when the Romans declared war against Antiochus III, Publius Cornelius Scipio offered to join his brother Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus if the Senate entrusted the chief command to him. 

Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus

The two brothers concluded the war by a decisive victory at Magnesia in the same year.  Both were the sons of Cornelius Scipio Africanus.  When the Scipio brothers returned to Rome after a successful war in the east, the senate persecuted the two tribunes in 187 BCE.  

  Scipio's political enemies, led by Cato the Elder, had gained ground.  Cato the Elder to distinguish him from his grandson Cato the Younger was from an ancient Plebian family who all served in Rome’s army.  The Consul Lucius Flaccus brought him to Rome where he held successively high offices, Military tribune, Questor, Aedile, Praetor and Consul and finally censor in 184 BCE. He fought in the Second Punic War when Hannibal overran Italy to the time Hasdrubal lost his life in battle.  Afterwards he served on the peace council to Carthage, where he urged the destruction of that city.  They say after visiting the area and seeing the prosperity and revitalization of Carthage that he was convinced that, the security of Rome must rely on its annihilation.  It was from that time on he began to use the phrase “Moreover, I advise Carthage must be destroyed.”  To the Romans themselves there was little in this behavior which seemed worthy of censure, it was respected rather as a traditional example of old Roman manners.  The senator Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, who favored a different course that would not destroy Carthage, and who usually prevailed in the debates, opposed him.

  The chief magistrates of the Roman Republic had almost become a patrimony of a few distinguished families whose wealth was correspondent with the upper-class birth.  Popular acts of graceful but corrupting generosity, by charming manners, and by the appeal of hereditary honors-they collected.  Their material power granted by a multitude of clients and followers.  Nevertheless, reaction to them was strong.  The less fortunate nobles jealous of this exclusive oligarchy placed themselves at the head of a party that showed its determination to rely on purer models to attach importance to ancient ways.  In their eyes rusticity, austerity, and asceticism were the marks of Sabine robustness and religion, and of the old Roman inflexible integrity of love of order.

  In the Senate Lucius Scipio was prosecuted on the grounds of misappropriation of money received from Antiochus and  was about to show his account books. As Lucius was in the act of producing his account-books, his brother wrested them from his hands, tore them in pieces, and flung them on the floor of the Senate house. Cornelius Scipio Africanus then allegedly asked the courts why they were concerned about how 3,000 talents had been spent and apparently unconcerned about how 15,000 Talents were now entering the state coffers (the tribute that Antiochus was paying Rome after his defeat by Lucius).   This high-handed act shamed the prosecution, and it appears that the case against Lucius was dismissed, though Lucius would again be prosecuted, and this time convicted, (but after the death of Scipio Africanus).

  In 185 BCE Cornelius Scipio Africanus, subsequently was accused of being bribed by Antiochus. By reminding the people that it was the anniversary of his victory at Zama, he caused an outburst of enthusiasm in his favor. The people crowded round him and followed him to the Capitol, where they offered thanks to the gods and begged them to give Rome more citizens like Cornelius Scipio Africanus. 

City of Rome in the time of the Republic

Despite the popular support that Scipio commanded, there were renewed attempts to bring him to trial, but these appear to have been deflected by his future son-in-law, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, the Elder (Livy, History of Rome, XXXVIII, 53).   It is supposedly in gratitude for this act that Scipio betrothed his youngest daughter Cornelia Africana Minor (then aged about 5) to Gracchus, several decades her senior.  He married her when she was 18 in 172 BCE.  Scipio retired to his country seat at Liternum on the coast of Campania. He lived there for the rest of his life, revealing his great magnanimity by attempting to prevent the ruin of the exiled Hannibal by Rome. He died probably in 183 BCE (the actual year and date of his death is unknown) aged about 53.

  From 184 -149 BCE Cato the Elder held no public office, but he continued to distinguish himself in the senate as the persistent opponent to new ideas.  Although he did get to see the beginning of the Third Punic War before dieing, (he died in the same year it began).

   By the middle of the second century, Carthage was thriving and it was hurting the trade of those Romans who had investments in North Africa.  Meanwhile, African tribes neighboring Carthage, the Numidian tribes who knew that according to the peace treaty between Carthage and Rome that been had concluded after the Second Punic War, if Carthage overstepped the line drawn in the sand to take military action against them, Rome would interpret the move as an act of aggression. This offered these daring African neighbors to raid Carthage with impunity.

Numidian Raiding Party

The Numidians took advantage of this reason to feel secure and made many raids into Carthaginian territory, knowing their victims could not pursue them.  Eventually, Carthage became tired of the Numidian/Roman charade and in 149 BCE Carthage got back into armor and went after the Numidians. The Numidians under Massinissa who had a treaty and was an ally of Rome sent messengers to Rome reporting the actions taken by Carthage. 

Phase 5

The End of the  Second War 

   The Carthaginian peace party then arranged another armistice. This was after Hannibal had been recalled from Italy by the war party in Carthage.  Hannibal's arrival immediately restored the predominance of the war party, which placed him in command of a combined force of African levies and his mercenaries from Italy. However, Hannibal was opposed to this policy and tried to convince them not to send the untrained African levies into battle.  In 202 BCE, Hannibal met Scipio in a peace conference. 

Hannibal and Scipio Meet at the Peace Conference

  Despite the two generals' mutual admiration, negotiations floundered, according to the Romans due to "Punic faith", meaning bad faith. This Roman expression referred to the alleged breach of protocols which ended the First Punic War by the Carthaginian attack on Saguntum in Iberia, Hannibal's perceived breaches of the idealized Roman military etiquette (i.e. Hannibal's numerous ambuscades), as well as the armistice violated by the Carthaginians in the period before Hannibal's return- the captured Roman fleet.  This marked the end of the temporary armistice.

  This led to the Battle of Zama, fought around October 19, 202 BCE, it was the last battle fought in the Second Punic War.  Hannibal led an army composed of mercenaries, local citizens and veterans and Numidian cavalry from his Italian campaigns, and Scipio led the already present Roman army, along with a body of Numidian cavalry.  The Romans had superiority in cavalry and the Carthaginians had superiority in infantry.  The Roman army was generally better armed and trained than the Carthaginians.  Hannibal had refused to lead this army into battle, because he did not believe they would fight and stand their ground.  There had been bitter arguments between the oligarchy and him.  His co-general Hasdrubal Gisco was forced to commit suicide by a violent mob after he spoke of Hannibal’s view of the military situation, “That these troops should not be used this in battle.”  Before the battle, Hannibal gave a speech only to his veterans and no one else.

  The battle took place at Zama Regia, near Siliana 130 km south-west of the modern capital Tunis. Hannibal was first to march and reach the plains of Zama Regia, which were suitable for cavalry maneuvering. This also gave an upper edge in turn to Scipio who relied heavily on his Roman heavy cavalry and Numidian light cavalry. Hannibal deployed his troops facing northwest, while Scipio deployed his troops in front of the Carthaginian army facing southeast (Nardo, Don, The battle of Zama). 

   Hannibal's army consisted of 36,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 80 war elephants, while Scipio had a total of 29,000 infantry and 6,100 cavalry (Lazenby, Hannibal's War). Hannibal putting his cavalry on the flanks, with the inexperienced Carthaginian cavalry on the right, and the Numidians on the left, Hannibal aligned the rest of his troops in three straight lines behind his elephants (Carey, Hannibal’s Last Battle).  His first line consisted of mixed infantry of mercenaries from Gaul, Liguria, and the Balearic Islands. In his second line, he placed the Carthaginian and Libyan citizen levies, while his veterans from Italy he put in the third line (Frontinus, Sextus Julius (1925), Bennet, Charles E, ed., Stratagemata).

    Hannibal intentionally held back his third infantry line, in order to thwart Scipio's tendency to pin the Carthaginian center and envelop his opponent's lines, as he had previously done at the Battle of Ilipa (Delbrück, Hans, History of the Art of War: Warfare in antiquity). Livy states that Hannibal deployed 4000 Macedonians in the second line, which is normally rejected as Roman propaganda. However, T. Dorey suggested that there might have been a grain of truth in the story if the Carthaginians had recruited a trivial number of mercenaries from Macedonia who had gone without official blessing (Dorey, T.A. (1957), "Macedonian Troops at the Battle of Zama").

Battle of Zama Part 1

   Scipio knew that elephants would be ordered to charge forward, but they could only continue their charge in a straight line (Africanus, Scipio; Hart, BH Liddell; Grant, Michael, Greater Than Napoleon).   Scipio predicted that if he opened gaps in his troops, the elephants would simply pass between them, without harming any of his soldiers. Scipio created the lanes between the army regiments across the depth of his troops and hid them with maniples of skirmishers. The plan was that when the elephants charged, these lanes would open, allowing them to pass through the legionaries' ranks and be dealt with at the rear of the army.  

The Elephant Charge at the Battle of Zama

  Hannibal and the Carthaginians had relied on cavalry superiority in previous battles such as Cannae, but Scipio, recognizing their importance, held the cavalry advantage at Zama. This was due in part to his raising of a new cavalry regiment in Sicily and careful courting of Masinissa as an ally.  Hannibal most likely believed that the combination of the war elephants and the depth of the first two lines would weaken and disorganize the Roman advance. This would have allowed him to complete a victory with his reserves in the third line and overlap Scipio's lines.

  At the outset of the battle, Hannibal unleashed his elephants and skirmishers against the Roman troops in order to break the cohesion of their lines and exploit the breaches that could be opened (Scullard, Howard Hayes (1930), Scipio Africanus in the second Punic war).  The Roman skirmishers confronted the attack. In addition, Scipio ordered the cavalry to blow loud horns to frighten the beasts, which partly succeeded, and several rampaging elephants turned towards the Carthaginian left wing and disordered it completely. Seizing this opportunity, Masinissa led his Numidian cavalry and charged at the Carthaginian left wing, which was composed of Numidian cavalry, and were diverted off the field of battle. Meanwhile, the rest of the elephants were carefully lured through the lanes and taken to the rear of the Roman army, where they were killed. Scipio's plan to neutralize the threat of the elephants had worked. Scipio's troops then fell back into traditional Roman battle formation. Laelius, the commander of Roman left wing, charged against the Carthaginian right. The Carthaginian cavalry, acting on the instructions of Hannibal, allowed the Roman cavalry to chase them to lure them away from the battlefield so that they would not attack the Carthaginian armies in the rear (Goldsworth, Adrian (2006), The Fall of Carthage, The Punic Wars).

Battle of Zama Part 2

  Scipio now marched with his center towards the Carthaginian center, which was under the direct command of Hannibal. Hannibal moved forward with only two lines and the third line of veterans remained in reserve. After a close contest, the first line of Hannibal repulsed by the Roman hastati (Africanus, Scipio; Hart, BH Liddell; Grant, Michael, Greater Than Napoleon).    Hannibal ordered his second line not to allow the first line in their ranks. The bulk of them managed to escape and to position themselves on the wings of the second line on Hannibal's instructions (Davis, William Stearns, Readings in Ancient History — Illustrative Extracts from the Sources).   Hannibal now charged with his second line. A furious struggle ensued and the Roman hastati were beaten back with heavy losses. Scipio reinforced the hastati with the second line Principes (Nardo, Don, The battle of Zama).

    With this reinforcement, the Roman front renewed their attack and defeated Hannibal's second line. Again, the second line was not allowed to merge with the third line and was forced to the wings along with the first line. Carthaginian cavalry carried out Hannibal's instructions well and there was no sign of Roman cavalry on the battlefield. Once they were far enough away, they turned and attacked the Roman cavalry but were repulsed in the end. At this point, there was a pause in the battle as both sides redeployed their troops. Scipio played for time as he redeployed his troops in a single line with the hastati in the middle and the Principes in the inner wings and the triarii on the outer wings. Hannibal waited for Scipio to attack. The resulting clash was fierce and bloody, with neither side achieving local superiority. However, Scipio was able to rally his men (Africanus, Scipio; Hart, BH Liddell; Grant, Michael, Greater Than Napoleon).   The battle finally turned in the Roman's favor as the Roman cavalry returned to the battlefield and attacked the Carthaginian line from behind. The Carthaginian infantry was encircled and annihilated. 

Battle of Zama Part 3

Thousands of Carthaginians, including Hannibal, managed to escape the slaughter (Delbrück, Hans, History of the Art of War: Warfare in antiquity).   Hannibal experienced a major defeat that put an end to all resistance on the part of Carthage. In total, as many as 20,000 men of Hannibal’s army died at Zama, while 20,000 became prisoners. The Romans, on the other hand, suffered as few as 2,500 dead (Adrian Goldsworth, The Fall of Carthage, The Punic Wars).

  After their defeat, Hannibal convinced the Carthaginians to accept peace. Notably, he broke the rules of the assembly by forcibly removing a speaker who supported continued resistance. Afterwards, he was obliged to apologize for his behavior. Therefore, after Scipio's victory at Zama, the war ended, with the Carthaginian senate suing for peace. Unlike the treaty that ended the First Punic War, the terms Carthage acceded to were so punishing that it was never able to challenge Rome for supremacy of the Mediterranean again. The treaty bankrupted Carthage and destroyed any chance of its being a military power in the future, although its economic recovery was quick. One provision was that the Carthaginians could not make war without Roman consent.  Carthage lost Iberia forever, and Rome firmly established her power there over large areas. Rome imposed a war indemnity of 10,000 talents of silver (300 tonnes/660,000 pounds), limited the Carthaginian navy to 10 ships (to ward off pirates).   The Numidians took the opportunity to capture and plunder Carthaginian territory. 

Carthage at the End of the Second Punic War (in Pink)

Phase 4

The End of the War in Italy

  After the battle, Hasdrubal Gisco departed for Africa to visit the powerful Numidian King Syphax.  He was met by Cornelius Scipio Africanus in the court of King Syphax, who was also courting the favor of the Numidians.  Mago Barca fled to the Balearics, from whence he would sail to Liguria, and made an invasion of northern Italy in Genua, and there gathered Gallic and Ligurian reinforcements

Ancient Genua

  Mago's arrival in the north of the Italian peninsula happened just before Hannibal’s Battle of Crotona in 204 BCE in the south of the peninsula. Mago's reinforced army's marched towards the lands of the Boli and Insubres, Carthage's main Gallic allies and a place of retreat for Hasdrubal's defeated remnants.  The Romans in the Po Valley Raid in 203 BCE put him in check. This stopped the third attempted invasion of Italy early in its tracks from uniting with Hannibal's army in the south. The split up Carthaginian armies were less dangerous, allowing for Roman manpower to be directed to the invasion of Africa, despite the Sword of Damocles over their heads by the enemy troops on and around Roman territory.

      By 204 BCE, the Romans were clearly winning the war. Three years earlier, they had destroyed the army of Hasdrubal Barca who had marched from Iberia through the Alps into Italy to help his brother Hannibal.  Cornelius Scipio Africanus had taken advantage of Hasdrubal’s departure.  He broke the Carthaginian power on the Iberian Peninsula at the battle at Ilipa. Following the battle of the Metaurus river Hannibal decided to concentrate all his remaining forces and supporters in Bruttium, "to the remotest corner of Italy" (Livy, The History of Rome, Book XXVII, 51; Cassius Dio, Roman History, Book XVI; Appian, Hannibalic War, Book VIII, 54). 

Bruttium (Calabria)

He relinquished his other possessions in Lucania and Greater Greece apparently because they lost their strategic importance and he deemed them indefensible against Rome’s superior forces. Furthermore, having lost many troops in cities taken by the Romans in the previous years, he wanted to diminish his losses. A mainly mountainous region surrounded by the sea, Bruttium provided Hannibal with a perfect base to check the Roman advance and force the Senate to keep a large standing army against him. Thus, he resorted to the same tactics his father Hamilcar Barca used for seven years during the First Punic war in Sicily. According to the military historian, Hans Delbrück the strategic goal behind these tactics was to induce Rome to an acceptable peace treaty in return for relinquishing the Punic base in Italy (Delbrück, Hans, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, I Teil: Das Altertum). Livy describes the character of the ensuing warfare in this way: 

"The struggle in Bruttium had assumed the character of brigandage much more than that of regular warfare. The Numidians (Hannibal's mercenaries) had commenced the practice, The Bruttians followed their example, not so much because of their alliance with the Carthaginians as because it was their traditional and natural method of carrying on war‘.

  At this point Rome had to decide how to proceed. After much debating in the Senate (Livy, XXVIII, 40-45) Scipio was elected consul for 205 BC, and was authorized to invade Africa (Livy, XXVIII, 45).  Scipio’s point was that only by this invasion  would he induce Carthage to recall Hannibal (Cassius Dio, XVII; Appian, Hannibalic War, IX, 55) and Mago, who had set up another Carthaginian stronghold in Italy by landing in Liguria. He was not given sufficient resources though (Cassius Dio, XVII, Appian, The Punic Wars, II, 7) and had to spend a year in preparations for the expedition from Sicily.

    With time Scipio’s assessment proved correct. For four years, the main Roman forces were tied up in Bruttium while others were diverted to Etruria and Cisalpine Gaul to face Mago. In 206 BCE, the Senate appointed two consuls to Bruttium (Livy, XXVIII, 10).  Cassius Dio explains their inaction: "Hannibal for a time was keeping quiet, satisfied if he might only retain such advantages as were already his. And the consuls, believing that his power would waste away even without a battle, also waited"(Cassius Dio, XVI).   Appian states that Hannibal was awaiting help from Carthage. This did not come, for a large convoy of 100 ships with soldiers, money and supplies was blown off course by high winds, then intercepted and routed by the Roman fleet at Sardinia (Appian, Hannibalic War, VIII, 54).  Hannibal had to raise heavy taxes and collect more resources by confiscations. These measures undermined his popularity among the local population and were the cause for several cases of defection (Appian, Hannibalic War, IX, 57).  The deportation of unreliable citizens from strategic fortresses, referred by Appian, produced more security issues for Hannibal but not in the case of Locri. In 205 BCE, a Roman detachment, sent from Rhegium by Scipio, managed to capture a part of the town by a sudden assault. 

Coastline of Rhegium

Hannibal moved quickly to expel the enemy "and the Romans would not have held out had not the population, embittered by the tyranny and rapacity of the Carthaginians, taken their side" (Livy, XXIX, 6).

  Pressed by the loss of the strategic port, Hannibal set his base "at Croton, which he found to be well situated for his operations and where he established his magazines and his headquarters against the other towns" (Appian, Hannibalic War, IX, 57).   As in the previous year two armies of two legions each, one commanded by the consul Publius Licinius Crassus, and the other by the proconsul Q. Caecilius (Livy, XXVIII, 45) confronted him.   For Livy the most memorable event in Bruttium in 205 BC was a pestilence that "attacked the Romans and the Carthaginians and was equally fatal to both, but in addition to the epidemic, the Carthaginians were suffering from scarcity of food"(Livy, XXVIII, 46).  This occurred toward the year’s end. The disease was so serious that Crassus could not return to Rome for conducting the elections of the next consul.  The Consuls recommended to  Senate to disband one of the armies in Bruttium, to preserve the soldiers’ lives (Livy, XXIX, 13).   The Senate let Crassus do what he deemed right and Publius Sempronius Tuditanus, was elected to go the following year to Bruttium  As a new consul, Sempronius had to enroll fresh troops (Livy, XXIX, 13).

A City Street in Ancient Croton

  The first battle near Croton took place in the summer of 204 BC. In Livy’s words, it was an irregular battle that began by an accidental clash between the marching columns of Hannibal and Sempronius. The Carthaginians repulsed their enemies who retreated in confusion to their camp leaving 1,200 dead. Hannibal was not prepared to storm the fortified camp, so the Romans were not completely defeated. Nevertheless, Sempronius received a severe blow and judged that his two legions were no match to the Carthaginians. He abandoned the camp under the cover of the following night and summoned the proconsul P. Licinius Crassus (Livy, XXIX, 36).

  Things began to change in Africa. In 206 BCE, there was a succession of kings in eastern Numidia that ended in a division of land between Carthage and the western Numidian king Sphanx. Meanwhile Massinissa who had lost his Cartthaginian fiancé went over to the Romans with whom he already had a treaty.

 Mago had been put in check in 203 BC in the Po Valley Raid by the Romans under the proconsul M Cornelius Carthegus and the praetor P. Quintillius Varus who led an army of four legions altogether in a regular battle on Insubrian land (not far from modern Milan).

  Each of the opponents met a second time and deployed their forces into battle lines.  The Roman army with two legions in front and left the other two and cavalry in reserve. Some modern estimates put his overall strength at more than 30,000 (Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars).  Mago also took care for a possible reverse, keeping in the rear the Gallic levy and a few elephants he had.  The course of the battle showed that the first Carthaginian line performed better and the Gauls were less reliable. From the onset, the Romans made futile attempts to break the enemy’s resistance and were pressed hard themselves.   Then Varus moved the cavalry (3,000 or 4,000 horsemen), hoping to repulse and confuse the Carthaginian lines. However, Mago was not surprised and moved forward the elephants just in time. The horses were stricken by fear and as a result the Roman cavalry was dispersed, chased by Mago’s light Numidian cavalry.  The elephants turned on the Roman infantry, which suffered heavy losses. The battle only took a bad turn for Mago when Cornelius brought into action the legions of the second line. The elephants were showered upon by darts, with most of them falling, the rest were forced to turn back against their own ranks. Mago ordered the Gauls to stop the Roman counter-attack, but they were routed.  According to Livy, all ended with a general flight of the Carthaginians, who lost up to 5,000 men. Yet, as Livy himself states, the Romans owed their success to the wounding of the Carthaginian commander, who had to be carried away almost fainting from the field because his thigh was pierced. The first Roman line lost 2,300 men, the second also took casualties, among them three military tribunes. The cavalry was not spared, many noble Equites were trampled to death by the elephants (Livy 18). 

  The victory was neither bloodless, nor complete.  During the night Mago withdrew his forces to the Ligurian coast, conceding the battlefield to the Romans (Livy, XXX, 19). For Mago the setback was severe, considering what gains a victory would have brought.  The Romans were left in command of the Po Valley and all hopes for a repetition of the events from the beginning of the war faded. The Romans owed their success to  their wounding of Mago.
     In 203 BCE, Cornelius Scipio Africanus given command of the legions in Sicily had to levy volunteers for his plan to end the war by an invasion of Africa. The legions in Sicily were mainly the survivors of Cannae, who were to serve in the war until it was over. Scipio was also one of the survivors and had served during the Siege of Syracuse with them, but, unlike the ordinary soldiers, he did go home, and had run successfully for public office and was given command of the troops in Sicily. He sailed with his army to Africa and landed at Utica, a city that had now allied itself with Rome instead of Carthage.

Cornelius Scipio Africanus

  Hasdrubal Gisco and Syphax had both succeeded in escaping from their camps, which the Roman consul Cornelius Scipio Africanus and his Numidian ally Masinissa had destroyed. Hasdrubal and Syphax fell back, with a few followers who had also escaped the massacre at the Carthaginian battlefields in Iberia. The arrival of four thousand mercenaries from Southern Iberia made the Carthaginians determined to make one more effort to stop the armies of Cornelius Scipio Africanus from advancing across North Africa. New levies were raised in Carthage and in Numidia, and soon Hasdrubal and Syphax found themselves at the head of an army of 30,000 men. In 203 BCE Scipio, whose command was extended until the end of the war, marched from his camp at Utica to meet Hasdrubal and Syphax at a place called the Great Plains.

  The battle was fought between a Roman army under the leadership of Scipio Africanus against a combined Carthaginian/Numidian army, supplemented by Spanish mercenaries (Celtiberians), of which the Carthaginian part was led by Hasdrubal Gisco and the Numidian part by Syphax.  Hasdrubal positioned the Spanish mercenaries in the center, subsequently flanked by the Carthaginian infantry and cavalry. The Roman infantry arranged in the triplex acies. That is to say, the hastati formed the first line; the Principes the second, and the triarii formed the third line (in maniple formation).  The charge of the Roman cavalry made the Carthaginian infantry and cavalry flee from the field. Only the Spanish infantry remained standing. The Spanish infantry defended themselves fiercely. The number of Spanish mercenaries was about equal to the first line of the Romans, the hastati. Then Scipio ordered his Principes and triarii to march from behind the hastati and attack the flanks of the Spanish mercenaries. The Spanish mercenaries were defeated with only a handful managing to escape. The Numidians under Syphax also remained fighting before fleeing.  Then Masinissa and Laelius, defeated him at the Battle of Cirta, and pursued him back to his kingdom in Numidia. Where Syphax was captured and brought back to the Romans as a prisoner. The Romans gave Syphax’s kingdom back to Masinissa, the land from which he had originally been exiled.

  With that, the panicked Carthaginians felt that they had no alternative but to offer peace to Scipio.   Scipio, who had the authority to do so, granted them peace on generous terms. Under the treaty, Carthage could keep its African territory, but would lose its overseas empire, by that time a fait-accompli. Masinissa was to allowed to expand Numidia into other parts of Africa. In addition, Carthage was to reduce its fleet and pay a war indemnity. The Roman senate ratified the treaty. Meanwhile, the Carthaginians breached the armistice agreement by capturing a stranded Roman fleet in the Gulf of Tunis and stripping it of supplies. The Carthaginians no longer believed that the treaty was advantageous, and rebuffed it under much Roman protest (Delbrück, Hans, History of the Art of War: Warfare in antiquity).

  These actions persuaded some of the Carthaginians that it was time to sue for peace. Others pleaded for the recall of the sons of Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal and Mago, who were still fighting the Romans in Bruttium and Cisalpine Gaul respectively.

  The fighting around Croton continued in 203 BC, but as Livy puts it himself, there are no clear accounts of the events. Livy is particularly suspicious of a story that the consul Cnaeus Servilius Caepio killed 5,000 Carthaginian soldiers in a pitched battle (Livy, XXX, 19).   One thing is sure – Servilius could not prevent Hannibal from departing safely to Africa when the time arrived for him to do so. Appian informs us that for the transportation of his veterans Hannibal even built more ships in addition to the fleet that arrived at Croton from Carthage (Appian, Hannibalic War, IX, 58).  This too was unimpeded by the Romans (Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars)

 Hannibal was recalled from Italy by the war party at Carthage. After leaving a record of his expedition engraved in Punic and Greek upon bronze tablets in the temple of Juno at Croton, he sailed back to Africa. (These records were later quoted by Polybius.) Hannibal's arrival immediately restored the predominance of the war party, who placed him in command of a combined force of African levies and his mercenaries from Italy.

Hannibal's Complete Invasion Route

Phase 3

The End of the War in Iberia

  The climax of Carthaginian expansion occurred when the biggest Greek city in Italy, Tarentum, switched sides in 212 BC. The Battle of Tarentum (212 BC) was a carefully planned coup by Hannibal and members of the city's democratic faction. There were two separate successful assaults on the gates of the city. This enabled the Punic army, which had approached unobserved behind a screen of marauding Numidian horsemen, to enter the city by surprise and take all but the citadel where the Romans and their supporting faction were able to rally. The Carthaginians failed to take the citadel, but subsequent fortifications around this enemy stronghold enabled the city to remain under Punic control. However, the harbour was blocked and made useless for ships trying to make port. 

Ruins of Ancient Tarentum

  The Battle of Capua (212 BC) was a stalemate, since neither side could defeat the other. The Romans decided to withdraw and broke off the siege of Capua. As a result, the Capuan cavalry was reinforced with half of the available Numidian cavalry, 2,000 riders.

  In the Battle of Beneventum (212 BC), Hanno the Elder was again defeated, this time by Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, who also captured his camp. The following battle was the Battle of the Silarus, in the same year, where the Romans under Marcus Centenius was ambushed by Hannibal and lost 15,000 men. In addition, in 210 BC, the Battle of Herdonia resulted in another Roman defeat, with only 2,000 Romans out of a force of 18,000 surviving a direct attack by Hannibal's numerically superior forces, combined with an ambush cutting off the Roman line of retreat.  

  In 210 BC, the Battle of Numistro between Marcellus and Hannibal was inconclusive, but the Romans stayed on his heels until the also inconclusive Battle of Canusium in 209 BC. In the meantime, this battle enabled another Roman army under Fabius to approach Tarentum and take it by treachery in the Battle of Tarentum (209 BC). Hannibal, at that time, had been able to disengage from Marcellus and was only 8.0 km (5 mi) away when the city fell. The city was under the command of Carthalo (who was bound to Fabius by an agreement of hospitality) and surrendered. On hearing, however, of his brother’s defeat and death at the Metaurus he retired into Bruttium, where he maintained himself for the ensuing years.

  The war began to wind down when Carthage stopped taking measures to ensure its own survival and security.  The first was Hannibal’s indecision to take Rome (twice), and the second was when the Carthaginians in Iberia did not follow up on their victories and allowed 8,000 Romans to regroup in northern Iberia.

   After the Romans took New Carthage (Latin: Carthago Nova) in 209 BC the Carthaginian forces seemed to be on bad terms with each other and were scattered about the region.  Hasdrubal Barca was in Central Iberia, Mago was near Gibraltar, and Hasdrubal Gisco near the mouth of the Tagus River at least ten days away from New Carthage.  However, the city had been under was under Mago before its fall.  Thus, the entire eastern coast now belonged to the Romans along with their military stores including the silver mines near by.

  In Iberia, the Battle of Ilipa in 206 BC is considered arguably one of the most brilliant battles fought during the Second Punic War.  After the Battle of Baecula and Hasdrubal Barca’s departure, further Carthaginian reinforcements disembarked in Iberia in early 207 BC under Hanno, who soon joined Mago Barca. Together they were raising a powerful army by the heavy recruitment of Celtiberians. Meanwhile, Hasdrubal Gisco also advanced his army from Gades into Andalusia. Thus, Cornelius Scipio Africanus was facing two concentrated enemy forces, one of which would no doubt fall on his rear if he tried to attack the other.

Map Showing Battles fought in Iberia

  After careful planning,  Cornelius Scipio Africanus decided to send a detachment under Silanus to strike Mago first. Marching with great speed, Silanus was able to achieve complete surprise when he fell on the Carthaginian camps, which resulted in the dispersion of Mago’s Celtiberians and Hanno's capture.  Thus, Hasdrubal left alone in facing Scipio’s concentrated force, but the Carthaginian general was able to avoid battle by splitting his troops among fortified cities. The Iberian campaign of 207 BC ended without any further major action.

  In the spring of 206, the Carthaginians launched their last great effort to recover their Iberian holdings. Mago was joined at Ilipa by Hasdrubal Gisco, creating a force estimated at 54,000 to 70,000, considerably larger than Cornelius Scipio Africanus’ army of 43,000 men, which was composed of a large number of Iberian allies who were not as seasoned as Roman legionaries.  Ilipa was an ancient town located near modern Seville Spain in the province of Andalusia in southern Spain, which includes Gibraltar. 

 Livy's figures, however, give the Carthaginian army 50,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry (where he mentioned other sources give the figure of 70,000, such as Polybius at 11.20, but Livy believes it was the lesser number), whilst he puts Scipio's force at 55,000 men, so it was also possible Scipio outnumbered the Carthaginians by a slight margin (Livy, 28.13).

  Upon the arrival of the Romans, Mago unleashed a daring attack on the Roman camp with most of his cavalry, under his Numidian ally Masinissa. However, Cornelius Scipio Africanus anticipated this tactic. Who had concealed his own cavalry behind a hill, which charged into the Carthaginian flank.  This threw back the enemy with heavy losses on Mago’s side.  The two opponents spent the next few days observing and testing each other, with Scipio always waiting to lead out his troops only after the Carthaginians had advanced from their camp first. The Roman formation always presented the legions in the center and Iberians on the wings, thus leading Hasdrubal and Mago to believe that this would be the Roman arrangement on the day of battle.

  Believing his deception had taken a firm hold on the Carthaginian commanders. Cornelius Scipio Africanus made his move. First, he ordered the army to be fed and armed before daylight. He then promptly sent his cavalry and light troops (velites) against the Carthaginian outposts at daybreak, while advancing with his main force behind, all the way to the front of the Carthaginian position. This day his legions stood at the wings and the Iberians in the centre.

  The Carthaginians were surprised by the Romans’ sudden attack. The Carthaginians rushed to arm themselves then sallied forth without breakfast. Still believing that  Cornelius Scipio Africanus  would arrange his forces as he had in the earlier fashion daily, Hasdrubal deployed his elite Africans in the he centre and the Iberian mercenaries on his wings. Hasdrubal was not able to change formation after discovering the new Roman arrangement because the opposing army was too close. Because Scipio had ordered his troops to form for battle closer to the Carthaginian camp.

  For the next few hours, Scipio held back his infantry behind the skirmishing light troops and thus amplified the effect of the missed breakfast on his enemy. When he finally decided to attack, the light troops retreated through the space between the maniples to position themselves behind the legions on the wings; then the main advance began. With his wings advancing at a faster pace than the Iberians in his center, Scipio formed a concave or reverse Cannae, battle line. Furthermore, the Roman general expanded his wings by ordering the light troops to the flanks of the legionaries, and the cavalry , thus enveloping the whole Carthaginian line on both sides.  Still refusing his center, Scipio’s legions, light troops, and cavalry attacked the half-trained Iberians on the Carthaginian wings from front, flank, and rear respectively. The Carthaginian center was helpless to reinforce its wings with the threat of the Iberian force that was looming large in the near distance but not attacking.

  With the inevitable destruction of its wings, the Carthaginian center was further demoralized and confused by the trampling by their own maddened elephants, which were being driven towards the center by the Roman cavalry attacking the flanks. Combined with hunger and fatigue, the Carthaginians started to withdraw, at first in good order.

However, as Scipio now pressed his advantage by ordering his Iberian center into battle, the Carthaginians crumbled, and a sudden downpour, which brought a hold to all actions on the field, and enabled the remaining Carthaginians to seek refuge in their camp, only averted a massacre that might have rivaled the one in Cannae.

 After Ilipa although temporarily safe in their camp, the Carthaginians were not able to rest. Facing the inevitable Roman attack the next morning, they were obliged to strengthen their defenses. Nevertheless, as more and more Iberian mercenaries deserted the Carthaginians as night drew forward, Hasdrubal tried to slip away with his remaining men in darkness.

  Scipio immediately ordered a pursuit. Led by the cavalry, the whole Roman army was hot on Hasdrubal’s tail. When the Romans finally caught up with the Carthaginian host, the butchery began. Hasdrubal had only 6,000 men, who then fled onto a mountaintop without any water supply. This remnant of the Carthaginian army surrendered a short time later, but not before Hasdrubal and Mago had made good their escape.  This put an end of Carthage’s hold on Iberia (Spain).

  After his final subjugation of Carthaginian Iberia and revenge upon the Iberian chieftains, whose betrayal had led to the death of his father and uncle, Cornelius Scipio Africanus  returned to Rome.  In 205 BCE, he was elected as consul by a unanimous nomination, and with the Scipiones and their allies now in power, he would have the control of Sicily as proconsul, from where he intended to invade Carthage.