Phase 2

Hasdrubal’s Attempt to Reinforce Hannibal

   However, with the arrival of Publius Cornelius Scipio (Africanus), the son of Publius Scipio, with another 10,000 troops in 210 BCE (with the Senate's orders to avenge his father and uncle) would soon change matters in Iberia.

Publius Cornelius Scipio (Africanus)

  New Carthage was a city situated on a peninsula - joined to the mainland to the east by a narrow isthmus.  The north side of the town was protected by a large lagoon, which fed into a canal, which protected the west side of the town. On the south side of the town, there was the Mediterranean Sea. Because of this geography, New Carthage took advantage of the terrain to be very difficult to assault.

  Publius Cornelius Scipio sailed to Spain (Iberia) in late 210 BCE, and spent the winter organizing his army (the total force in Spain was approximately 30,000 men) and planning the assault on New 

Carthage. Opposing him were the three Carthaginian generals (Hasdrubal Barca, Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco), who were on bad terms with each other because of their family connections, and were geographically scattered (Hasdrubal Barca in central Spain, Mago near Gibraltar and Hasdrubal near the mouth of the Tagus river), and at least 10 days away from New Carthage.

Map of New Carthage

   Livy mentions the force guarding the New Carthage - one thousand Carthaginian soldiers under command of Mago, who picked out a further 2000 men from the city who defended the front gate, and an unspecified amount of townsmen to watch for sudden emergences (Livy, 26.44).

  Setting up camp across the isthmus, Cornelius Scipio isolated the town on the landward side.  With the Roman fleet (commanded by Gaius Laelius) blockading the town from the sea, the town was isolated from outside help. After beating back an attack from the town’s defenders, Scipio then attacked over the isthmus, while the fleet attacked from the southern side. The first attack was a failure; however, Scipio renewed the attack later in the day, with the addition of a party attacking through the lagoon on the northern side. Aided by an expected squall (which drained some of the lagoon into the Mediterranean, reducing the depth of the lagoon so the Roman troops could easily cross it), the party managed to scale the undefended northern wall and attacked the rear of the defenders defending the isthmus. At the same time, the naval forces managed to penetrate the town from the south (Livy 26.45).

Remains of New Carthage Walls

    Polybius gives a description of how Cornelius Scipio Africanus stormed New Carthage in 209 BC during the Second Punic War:

"Having ...directed [his soldiers], according to the Roman custom, against the people in the city, telling them to kill everyone they met and to spare no one, and not to start looting until they received the order. The purpose of this custom is to strike terror. Accordingly, one can see in cities captured by the Romans not only humans who were slaughtered, but even dogs sliced in two and the limbs of other animals cut off. On this occasion the amount of such slaughter was very great" (John Keegan (1993-09-16). A history of warfare).

  With the fall of New Carthage, the Romans forced the Carthaginians to surrender the entire eastern coast of Spain, as well as capturing a large amount of military stores and the silver mines located nearby. It was a very serious defeat for the Carthaginian power in Iberia.

    After Hannibal’s descent from the Alps, he had a sting of impressive  victories against Rome (Dodge, Theodore (1994). Hannibal).  These victories had brought the Romans to the brink of despair. The Senate had issued a decree that forbade anyone to say the word, "Peace" within the city. Mourning was legislatively limited to 30 days; women could not cry in the public venues. In spite of such measures, there was much despair in the city and some young Romans of high birth were proposing mass desertion from the army and establishment of a new colony elsewhere. The proposed defection was put down and all thoughts of surrender were circumscribed (Dodge, Theodore (1994). Hannibal).

  However, in spite of the seeming ascendancy of Hannibal over Rome, his cause was in reality anything but that. His military chest stretched to its limit, and to this effect, he sent a deputation to Rome that requested money in return for hostages. The deputation presented their message outside the city walls, and the Senate forbade the purchase of hostages from the Carthaginians on an individual basis—deeming any enrichment of Hannibal through the wealth of Rome and its citizens to be unacceptable (Dodge, Theodore (1994). Hannibal).

  In 208 BCE, Publius Scipio Africanus defeated Hasdrubal in the Battle of Baecula, but was unable to stop him from his mission to supply reinforcements to his brother Hannibal.  Hasdrubal's campaign to come to his brother's aid in Italy had gone remarkably well up to that point. After adeptly escaping Publius Scipio Africanus at Baecula in Iberia and making his way into Gaul in the winter of 208 BCE, Hasdrubal waited until the spring of 207 BCE to make his way through the Alps and into Northern Italy. Hasdrubal made much faster progress due to his brother’s passage during his crossing, partly due to the constructions left behind by Hannibal’s army a decade earlier, but also due to the removal of the Gallic threat that had plagued Hannibal during that expedition. The Gauls now feared and respected the Carthaginians, and Hasdrubal could to pass through the Alps unmolested, many enthusiastic Gauls swelled his ranks. Hasdrubal, in the same fashion as his brother, succeeded in bringing his war elephants, raised and trained in Iberia, over the Alps.

The Northeastern Alps Today

    Rome was still reeling from the series of devastating defeats Hannibal had put on it ten years earlier, and the Romans were terrified at the prospect of fighting two sons of "the Thunderbolt" (a rough translation of Hamilcar Barca's surname) at once. In the meantime, Hannibal had moved westward into Bruttium the toe of the Italian boot.  The Senate hastily elected consuls Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius to face Hannibal and Hasdrubal respectively. Neither consul engaged his intended target initially. Claudius Nero's force of over 40,000 men was too formidable for Hannibal to engage openly. Therefore the two played an unproductive game of cat and mouse in Bruttium. Meanwhile, Marcus Livius, despite the added bulwark of two of the many Roman armies scattered across Italy — yielded cautiously to Hasdrubal, allowed him to push beyond the Metaurus River as far south as the town of Sena.

Bruttium 3rd Century BCE

  The big error occurred when Hasdrubal sent messengers to Hannibal.  Hasdrubal wished to meet with his brother in South Umbria. The Romans captured Hasdrubal’s messengers and his plans fell into the hands of the consul Claudius Nero. Nero quickly marched to the North with 7,000 men, 1,000 of whom were cavalry, in order to join up with Marcus Livius. Nero realized the seriousness of the situation and the enormous threat that a merging of the Carthaginian brothers’ armies would present to Rome. He and Marcus Livius decided to circumvent the authority of the Senate, instead advising them to organize levies for their own protection. Equestrians were dispatched forward along the line of march with orders for country people to prepare supplies for soldiers, who took only weapons from the camp. Both young and veteran volunteers joined Nero’s troops during the march.

  Claudius Nero quickly reached Marcus Livius, who was camped at Sena along with the Praetor Porcius. Hasdrubal was camped approximately a half-mile to the north. However, since Claudius Nero had conveniently arrived at night, his presence went unseen until the next day, when the Romans drew themselves up for battle. 

  Hasdrubal drew his army up as well, but upon closer observation of the forces assembled before him, noticed that Marcus Livius' army seemed to have grown considerably over the course of the night, and that he had a much larger contingent of cavalry. Hasdrubal remembered hearing a trumpet in the Roman camp heralding the arrival of an important figure the night before — a sound he had become familiar with during his entanglements with the Romans in Iberia — and correctly concluded that he was now facing two Roman armies. Fearing defeat, he retreated from the field.   However, there may have been a major skirmish at first before Hasdrubal vacated the field of battle.  It was the intelligence gained from this skirmish that alarmed him, which caused him to retreat.  The rest of the day passed without event, for the Romans prudently did not advance on Hasdrubal's fortifications - rather, they used military strategy to plan an overwhelming defeat for Hasdrubal. When nightfall came, Hasdrubal quietly led his army out of his camp with the intent of retreating into Gaul, where he could safely establish communications with Hannibal. Early on in the march, however, Hasdrubal's guides betrayed him, and left him lost and confused along the banks of the Metaurus River, searching futilely for a ford at which to cross.  The night passed with no change in Hasdrubal's misfortunes, and the morning found his army disarrayed, trapped against the banks of the Metaurus, and a great many of his Gallic troops drunk. With the Roman cavalry fast approaching and the legions under the two consuls not far behind, Hasdrubal reluctantly prepared for battle. 

Roman Equestrian (Roman Cavalry) 

The battle took place near the bank of Metaurus River, the exact site of the battle is uncertain.

The Metaurus River Today

 There has been much speculation on the site of the battle to both the north and south sides of the River (The Campaign of the Metaurus, B Henderson).  The exact numbers of troops on both sides are unknown. The data given by the ancient sources are either insufficient or contradictory. Appian for instance says that the Carthaginian force numbered 48,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry and 15 elephants (Appian, History of Rome, The Hannibalic War, 52).   Modern estimates suggest Hasdrubal's army was about 30,000 in strength (Barcelo, Pedro, Hannibal), and Marcus Livius' army of roughly equal numbers. 

  The Propraetor L. Porcius Licinius commanded two legions — as many men as the consul. This means that Livius and Porcius had between them four legions — equal to 32,000-40,000 men, including their Allies. However, the numbers of the allied contingents could have been less than usual due to the refusal of some of the Roman clients to provide auxiliaries. The Roman force was probably further diminished by earlier fighting with Hasdrubal the evidence of which is the presence of several thousand prisoners in Hasdrubal's camp. 

   About 7,000 troops accompanied Claudius Nero. Therefore, it is certain that Carthaginians were significantly outnumbered. The Carthaginians lacked cavalry, of which the Romans had a substantial number.

  Like most Carthaginian armies, Hasdrubal's was a mix of many different cultures and ethnicities, including Iberians, Ligurians, Gauls and few were of African origins. Hasdrubal’s right flank was on the River Metaurus and left flank at an inaccessible hilly terrain. He placed his Cavalry at right wing to guard it against superior Roman cavalry that could out flank its right wing. Contrary to this, hills at left and ravines in front guarded Hasdrubal’s left flank. Hasdrubal's best troops were Iberians, armed with shields and swords, made his right flank, along with the few African troops that he did have (not much is known about these troops — they may have been spearmen drawn from some Carthaginian territory, or from another part of Africa). The center was composed of Ligurians who were not as well trained as the men on his right flank. Finally, on his left, he placed the disorderly Gauls, who he hoped might not be involved due to the non traversable terrain (a deep ravine) in front of them. Hasdrubal also had ten elephants in his army. Marcus Livius Salinator deployed the Roman army in front of the Carthaginian force. Marcus Livius commanded the Roman left wing, right wing was under Gaius Claudius Nero, facing the inaccessible Gauls and center was under the command of Porcius Licinius. The Roman Cavalry moved to the left wing in facing the Carthaginian cavalry.

Battle of the Metaurus River

    The battle started with the Roman left flank charging the Carthaginian right, followed a little later by the Roman center. The outnumbered Carthaginian cavalry tumbled against the Roman cavalry. The Carthaginian right wing and center held their ground with the war elephants, initially succeeded in breaking the Roman lines and spreading mass confusion, making the initial combat favorable to Hasdrubal.

  Claudius Nero, on the Roman right flank, struggled to overcome the terrain that blocked his path to the unprepared Gauls on Hasdrubal's left. Seeing the futility in wasting further time attempting to reach them, he instead took half of his men and led them from behind the battling Roman lines to the extreme Roman left, swinging his troops around and crashing into the Carthaginian right flank with sudden force and intensity. The Carthaginian right wing, composed of Iberians, could not withstand this two-pronged attack of Marcus Livius from the front and Claudius Nero on their flank. They soon panicked and fled, collapsing onto the Carthaginian center and creating mass confusion.

 The disordered Carthaginian center now faced a three-pronged attack: Porcius from the front, Marcus Livius from their right flank, and Claudius Nero from the rear. By now the Roman cavalry had completely defeated the Carthaginian cavalry. This caused the Carthaginian center to give way, with that the general retreat of Hasdrubal’s army began. The Romans chased the retreating Carthaginians and met almost no resistance from the unfit Gauls. Most of the Carthaginian casualties occurred during this disordered retreat. The Carthaginian general, seeing that there was nothing more he could do, and presumably doubtful of his own prospects of escape or simply unwilling to be taken captive, charged into the thick of the nearly concluded battle and met a glorious, if pointless, death.

  Claudius Nero showed no respect for his fallen adversary. He had Hasdrubal's head severed from his body, taken south, and thrown into Hannibal's camp as a token of the brother's defeat.  Though history may not well remember Nero the Consul, the consequences of the battle he won and the Empire, which it safeguarded, it is certainly well known. With his brother dead and his soldiers routed or killed, and no hope of help from Carthage — which was too preoccupied with its own political infighting to send him aid — Hannibal's hopes of mustering a force sufficient in size and strength for the achievement of his war aims were utterly dashed.