Phase 4

The End of the War in Italy

  After the battle, Hasdrubal Gisco departed for Africa to visit the powerful Numidian King Syphax.  He was met by Cornelius Scipio Africanus in the court of King Syphax, who was also courting the favor of the Numidians.  Mago Barca fled to the Balearics, from whence he would sail to Liguria, and made an invasion of northern Italy in Genua, and there gathered Gallic and Ligurian reinforcements

Ancient Genua

  Mago's arrival in the north of the Italian peninsula happened just before Hannibal’s Battle of Crotona in 204 BCE in the south of the peninsula. Mago's reinforced army's marched towards the lands of the Boli and Insubres, Carthage's main Gallic allies and a place of retreat for Hasdrubal's defeated remnants.  The Romans in the Po Valley Raid in 203 BCE put him in check. This stopped the third attempted invasion of Italy early in its tracks from uniting with Hannibal's army in the south. The split up Carthaginian armies were less dangerous, allowing for Roman manpower to be directed to the invasion of Africa, despite the Sword of Damocles over their heads by the enemy troops on and around Roman territory.

      By 204 BCE, the Romans were clearly winning the war. Three years earlier, they had destroyed the army of Hasdrubal Barca who had marched from Iberia through the Alps into Italy to help his brother Hannibal.  Cornelius Scipio Africanus had taken advantage of Hasdrubal’s departure.  He broke the Carthaginian power on the Iberian Peninsula at the battle at Ilipa. Following the battle of the Metaurus river Hannibal decided to concentrate all his remaining forces and supporters in Bruttium, "to the remotest corner of Italy" (Livy, The History of Rome, Book XXVII, 51; Cassius Dio, Roman History, Book XVI; Appian, Hannibalic War, Book VIII, 54). 

Bruttium (Calabria)

He relinquished his other possessions in Lucania and Greater Greece apparently because they lost their strategic importance and he deemed them indefensible against Rome’s superior forces. Furthermore, having lost many troops in cities taken by the Romans in the previous years, he wanted to diminish his losses. A mainly mountainous region surrounded by the sea, Bruttium provided Hannibal with a perfect base to check the Roman advance and force the Senate to keep a large standing army against him. Thus, he resorted to the same tactics his father Hamilcar Barca used for seven years during the First Punic war in Sicily. According to the military historian, Hans Delbrück the strategic goal behind these tactics was to induce Rome to an acceptable peace treaty in return for relinquishing the Punic base in Italy (Delbrück, Hans, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, I Teil: Das Altertum). Livy describes the character of the ensuing warfare in this way: 

"The struggle in Bruttium had assumed the character of brigandage much more than that of regular warfare. The Numidians (Hannibal's mercenaries) had commenced the practice, The Bruttians followed their example, not so much because of their alliance with the Carthaginians as because it was their traditional and natural method of carrying on war‘.

  At this point Rome had to decide how to proceed. After much debating in the Senate (Livy, XXVIII, 40-45) Scipio was elected consul for 205 BC, and was authorized to invade Africa (Livy, XXVIII, 45).  Scipio’s point was that only by this invasion  would he induce Carthage to recall Hannibal (Cassius Dio, XVII; Appian, Hannibalic War, IX, 55) and Mago, who had set up another Carthaginian stronghold in Italy by landing in Liguria. He was not given sufficient resources though (Cassius Dio, XVII, Appian, The Punic Wars, II, 7) and had to spend a year in preparations for the expedition from Sicily.

    With time Scipio’s assessment proved correct. For four years, the main Roman forces were tied up in Bruttium while others were diverted to Etruria and Cisalpine Gaul to face Mago. In 206 BCE, the Senate appointed two consuls to Bruttium (Livy, XXVIII, 10).  Cassius Dio explains their inaction: "Hannibal for a time was keeping quiet, satisfied if he might only retain such advantages as were already his. And the consuls, believing that his power would waste away even without a battle, also waited"(Cassius Dio, XVI).   Appian states that Hannibal was awaiting help from Carthage. This did not come, for a large convoy of 100 ships with soldiers, money and supplies was blown off course by high winds, then intercepted and routed by the Roman fleet at Sardinia (Appian, Hannibalic War, VIII, 54).  Hannibal had to raise heavy taxes and collect more resources by confiscations. These measures undermined his popularity among the local population and were the cause for several cases of defection (Appian, Hannibalic War, IX, 57).  The deportation of unreliable citizens from strategic fortresses, referred by Appian, produced more security issues for Hannibal but not in the case of Locri. In 205 BCE, a Roman detachment, sent from Rhegium by Scipio, managed to capture a part of the town by a sudden assault. 

Coastline of Rhegium

Hannibal moved quickly to expel the enemy "and the Romans would not have held out had not the population, embittered by the tyranny and rapacity of the Carthaginians, taken their side" (Livy, XXIX, 6).

  Pressed by the loss of the strategic port, Hannibal set his base "at Croton, which he found to be well situated for his operations and where he established his magazines and his headquarters against the other towns" (Appian, Hannibalic War, IX, 57).   As in the previous year two armies of two legions each, one commanded by the consul Publius Licinius Crassus, and the other by the proconsul Q. Caecilius (Livy, XXVIII, 45) confronted him.   For Livy the most memorable event in Bruttium in 205 BC was a pestilence that "attacked the Romans and the Carthaginians and was equally fatal to both, but in addition to the epidemic, the Carthaginians were suffering from scarcity of food"(Livy, XXVIII, 46).  This occurred toward the year’s end. The disease was so serious that Crassus could not return to Rome for conducting the elections of the next consul.  The Consuls recommended to  Senate to disband one of the armies in Bruttium, to preserve the soldiers’ lives (Livy, XXIX, 13).   The Senate let Crassus do what he deemed right and Publius Sempronius Tuditanus, was elected to go the following year to Bruttium  As a new consul, Sempronius had to enroll fresh troops (Livy, XXIX, 13).

A City Street in Ancient Croton

  The first battle near Croton took place in the summer of 204 BC. In Livy’s words, it was an irregular battle that began by an accidental clash between the marching columns of Hannibal and Sempronius. The Carthaginians repulsed their enemies who retreated in confusion to their camp leaving 1,200 dead. Hannibal was not prepared to storm the fortified camp, so the Romans were not completely defeated. Nevertheless, Sempronius received a severe blow and judged that his two legions were no match to the Carthaginians. He abandoned the camp under the cover of the following night and summoned the proconsul P. Licinius Crassus (Livy, XXIX, 36).

  Things began to change in Africa. In 206 BCE, there was a succession of kings in eastern Numidia that ended in a division of land between Carthage and the western Numidian king Sphanx. Meanwhile Massinissa who had lost his Cartthaginian fiancé went over to the Romans with whom he already had a treaty.

 Mago had been put in check in 203 BC in the Po Valley Raid by the Romans under the proconsul M Cornelius Carthegus and the praetor P. Quintillius Varus who led an army of four legions altogether in a regular battle on Insubrian land (not far from modern Milan).

  Each of the opponents met a second time and deployed their forces into battle lines.  The Roman army with two legions in front and left the other two and cavalry in reserve. Some modern estimates put his overall strength at more than 30,000 (Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars).  Mago also took care for a possible reverse, keeping in the rear the Gallic levy and a few elephants he had.  The course of the battle showed that the first Carthaginian line performed better and the Gauls were less reliable. From the onset, the Romans made futile attempts to break the enemy’s resistance and were pressed hard themselves.   Then Varus moved the cavalry (3,000 or 4,000 horsemen), hoping to repulse and confuse the Carthaginian lines. However, Mago was not surprised and moved forward the elephants just in time. The horses were stricken by fear and as a result the Roman cavalry was dispersed, chased by Mago’s light Numidian cavalry.  The elephants turned on the Roman infantry, which suffered heavy losses. The battle only took a bad turn for Mago when Cornelius brought into action the legions of the second line. The elephants were showered upon by darts, with most of them falling, the rest were forced to turn back against their own ranks. Mago ordered the Gauls to stop the Roman counter-attack, but they were routed.  According to Livy, all ended with a general flight of the Carthaginians, who lost up to 5,000 men. Yet, as Livy himself states, the Romans owed their success to the wounding of the Carthaginian commander, who had to be carried away almost fainting from the field because his thigh was pierced. The first Roman line lost 2,300 men, the second also took casualties, among them three military tribunes. The cavalry was not spared, many noble Equites were trampled to death by the elephants (Livy 18). 

  The victory was neither bloodless, nor complete.  During the night Mago withdrew his forces to the Ligurian coast, conceding the battlefield to the Romans (Livy, XXX, 19). For Mago the setback was severe, considering what gains a victory would have brought.  The Romans were left in command of the Po Valley and all hopes for a repetition of the events from the beginning of the war faded. The Romans owed their success to  their wounding of Mago.
     In 203 BCE, Cornelius Scipio Africanus given command of the legions in Sicily had to levy volunteers for his plan to end the war by an invasion of Africa. The legions in Sicily were mainly the survivors of Cannae, who were to serve in the war until it was over. Scipio was also one of the survivors and had served during the Siege of Syracuse with them, but, unlike the ordinary soldiers, he did go home, and had run successfully for public office and was given command of the troops in Sicily. He sailed with his army to Africa and landed at Utica, a city that had now allied itself with Rome instead of Carthage.

Cornelius Scipio Africanus

  Hasdrubal Gisco and Syphax had both succeeded in escaping from their camps, which the Roman consul Cornelius Scipio Africanus and his Numidian ally Masinissa had destroyed. Hasdrubal and Syphax fell back, with a few followers who had also escaped the massacre at the Carthaginian battlefields in Iberia. The arrival of four thousand mercenaries from Southern Iberia made the Carthaginians determined to make one more effort to stop the armies of Cornelius Scipio Africanus from advancing across North Africa. New levies were raised in Carthage and in Numidia, and soon Hasdrubal and Syphax found themselves at the head of an army of 30,000 men. In 203 BCE Scipio, whose command was extended until the end of the war, marched from his camp at Utica to meet Hasdrubal and Syphax at a place called the Great Plains.

  The battle was fought between a Roman army under the leadership of Scipio Africanus against a combined Carthaginian/Numidian army, supplemented by Spanish mercenaries (Celtiberians), of which the Carthaginian part was led by Hasdrubal Gisco and the Numidian part by Syphax.  Hasdrubal positioned the Spanish mercenaries in the center, subsequently flanked by the Carthaginian infantry and cavalry. The Roman infantry arranged in the triplex acies. That is to say, the hastati formed the first line; the Principes the second, and the triarii formed the third line (in maniple formation).  The charge of the Roman cavalry made the Carthaginian infantry and cavalry flee from the field. Only the Spanish infantry remained standing. The Spanish infantry defended themselves fiercely. The number of Spanish mercenaries was about equal to the first line of the Romans, the hastati. Then Scipio ordered his Principes and triarii to march from behind the hastati and attack the flanks of the Spanish mercenaries. The Spanish mercenaries were defeated with only a handful managing to escape. The Numidians under Syphax also remained fighting before fleeing.  Then Masinissa and Laelius, defeated him at the Battle of Cirta, and pursued him back to his kingdom in Numidia. Where Syphax was captured and brought back to the Romans as a prisoner. The Romans gave Syphax’s kingdom back to Masinissa, the land from which he had originally been exiled.

  With that, the panicked Carthaginians felt that they had no alternative but to offer peace to Scipio.   Scipio, who had the authority to do so, granted them peace on generous terms. Under the treaty, Carthage could keep its African territory, but would lose its overseas empire, by that time a fait-accompli. Masinissa was to allowed to expand Numidia into other parts of Africa. In addition, Carthage was to reduce its fleet and pay a war indemnity. The Roman senate ratified the treaty. Meanwhile, the Carthaginians breached the armistice agreement by capturing a stranded Roman fleet in the Gulf of Tunis and stripping it of supplies. The Carthaginians no longer believed that the treaty was advantageous, and rebuffed it under much Roman protest (Delbrück, Hans, History of the Art of War: Warfare in antiquity).

  These actions persuaded some of the Carthaginians that it was time to sue for peace. Others pleaded for the recall of the sons of Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal and Mago, who were still fighting the Romans in Bruttium and Cisalpine Gaul respectively.

  The fighting around Croton continued in 203 BC, but as Livy puts it himself, there are no clear accounts of the events. Livy is particularly suspicious of a story that the consul Cnaeus Servilius Caepio killed 5,000 Carthaginian soldiers in a pitched battle (Livy, XXX, 19).   One thing is sure – Servilius could not prevent Hannibal from departing safely to Africa when the time arrived for him to do so. Appian informs us that for the transportation of his veterans Hannibal even built more ships in addition to the fleet that arrived at Croton from Carthage (Appian, Hannibalic War, IX, 58).  This too was unimpeded by the Romans (Caven, Brian, The Punic Wars)

 Hannibal was recalled from Italy by the war party at Carthage. After leaving a record of his expedition engraved in Punic and Greek upon bronze tablets in the temple of Juno at Croton, he sailed back to Africa. (These records were later quoted by Polybius.) Hannibal's arrival immediately restored the predominance of the war party, who placed him in command of a combined force of African levies and his mercenaries from Italy.

Hannibal's Complete Invasion Route