Phase 3

The End of the War in Iberia

  The climax of Carthaginian expansion occurred when the biggest Greek city in Italy, Tarentum, switched sides in 212 BC. The Battle of Tarentum (212 BC) was a carefully planned coup by Hannibal and members of the city's democratic faction. There were two separate successful assaults on the gates of the city. This enabled the Punic army, which had approached unobserved behind a screen of marauding Numidian horsemen, to enter the city by surprise and take all but the citadel where the Romans and their supporting faction were able to rally. The Carthaginians failed to take the citadel, but subsequent fortifications around this enemy stronghold enabled the city to remain under Punic control. However, the harbour was blocked and made useless for ships trying to make port. 

Ruins of Ancient Tarentum

  The Battle of Capua (212 BC) was a stalemate, since neither side could defeat the other. The Romans decided to withdraw and broke off the siege of Capua. As a result, the Capuan cavalry was reinforced with half of the available Numidian cavalry, 2,000 riders.

  In the Battle of Beneventum (212 BC), Hanno the Elder was again defeated, this time by Quintus Fulvius Flaccus, who also captured his camp. The following battle was the Battle of the Silarus, in the same year, where the Romans under Marcus Centenius was ambushed by Hannibal and lost 15,000 men. In addition, in 210 BC, the Battle of Herdonia resulted in another Roman defeat, with only 2,000 Romans out of a force of 18,000 surviving a direct attack by Hannibal's numerically superior forces, combined with an ambush cutting off the Roman line of retreat.  

  In 210 BC, the Battle of Numistro between Marcellus and Hannibal was inconclusive, but the Romans stayed on his heels until the also inconclusive Battle of Canusium in 209 BC. In the meantime, this battle enabled another Roman army under Fabius to approach Tarentum and take it by treachery in the Battle of Tarentum (209 BC). Hannibal, at that time, had been able to disengage from Marcellus and was only 8.0 km (5 mi) away when the city fell. The city was under the command of Carthalo (who was bound to Fabius by an agreement of hospitality) and surrendered. On hearing, however, of his brother’s defeat and death at the Metaurus he retired into Bruttium, where he maintained himself for the ensuing years.

  The war began to wind down when Carthage stopped taking measures to ensure its own survival and security.  The first was Hannibal’s indecision to take Rome (twice), and the second was when the Carthaginians in Iberia did not follow up on their victories and allowed 8,000 Romans to regroup in northern Iberia.

   After the Romans took New Carthage (Latin: Carthago Nova) in 209 BC the Carthaginian forces seemed to be on bad terms with each other and were scattered about the region.  Hasdrubal Barca was in Central Iberia, Mago was near Gibraltar, and Hasdrubal Gisco near the mouth of the Tagus River at least ten days away from New Carthage.  However, the city had been under was under Mago before its fall.  Thus, the entire eastern coast now belonged to the Romans along with their military stores including the silver mines near by.

  In Iberia, the Battle of Ilipa in 206 BC is considered arguably one of the most brilliant battles fought during the Second Punic War.  After the Battle of Baecula and Hasdrubal Barca’s departure, further Carthaginian reinforcements disembarked in Iberia in early 207 BC under Hanno, who soon joined Mago Barca. Together they were raising a powerful army by the heavy recruitment of Celtiberians. Meanwhile, Hasdrubal Gisco also advanced his army from Gades into Andalusia. Thus, Cornelius Scipio Africanus was facing two concentrated enemy forces, one of which would no doubt fall on his rear if he tried to attack the other.

Map Showing Battles fought in Iberia

  After careful planning,  Cornelius Scipio Africanus decided to send a detachment under Silanus to strike Mago first. Marching with great speed, Silanus was able to achieve complete surprise when he fell on the Carthaginian camps, which resulted in the dispersion of Mago’s Celtiberians and Hanno's capture.  Thus, Hasdrubal left alone in facing Scipio’s concentrated force, but the Carthaginian general was able to avoid battle by splitting his troops among fortified cities. The Iberian campaign of 207 BC ended without any further major action.

  In the spring of 206, the Carthaginians launched their last great effort to recover their Iberian holdings. Mago was joined at Ilipa by Hasdrubal Gisco, creating a force estimated at 54,000 to 70,000, considerably larger than Cornelius Scipio Africanus’ army of 43,000 men, which was composed of a large number of Iberian allies who were not as seasoned as Roman legionaries.  Ilipa was an ancient town located near modern Seville Spain in the province of Andalusia in southern Spain, which includes Gibraltar. 

 Livy's figures, however, give the Carthaginian army 50,000 infantry and 4,500 cavalry (where he mentioned other sources give the figure of 70,000, such as Polybius at 11.20, but Livy believes it was the lesser number), whilst he puts Scipio's force at 55,000 men, so it was also possible Scipio outnumbered the Carthaginians by a slight margin (Livy, 28.13).

  Upon the arrival of the Romans, Mago unleashed a daring attack on the Roman camp with most of his cavalry, under his Numidian ally Masinissa. However, Cornelius Scipio Africanus anticipated this tactic. Who had concealed his own cavalry behind a hill, which charged into the Carthaginian flank.  This threw back the enemy with heavy losses on Mago’s side.  The two opponents spent the next few days observing and testing each other, with Scipio always waiting to lead out his troops only after the Carthaginians had advanced from their camp first. The Roman formation always presented the legions in the center and Iberians on the wings, thus leading Hasdrubal and Mago to believe that this would be the Roman arrangement on the day of battle.

  Believing his deception had taken a firm hold on the Carthaginian commanders. Cornelius Scipio Africanus made his move. First, he ordered the army to be fed and armed before daylight. He then promptly sent his cavalry and light troops (velites) against the Carthaginian outposts at daybreak, while advancing with his main force behind, all the way to the front of the Carthaginian position. This day his legions stood at the wings and the Iberians in the centre.

  The Carthaginians were surprised by the Romans’ sudden attack. The Carthaginians rushed to arm themselves then sallied forth without breakfast. Still believing that  Cornelius Scipio Africanus  would arrange his forces as he had in the earlier fashion daily, Hasdrubal deployed his elite Africans in the he centre and the Iberian mercenaries on his wings. Hasdrubal was not able to change formation after discovering the new Roman arrangement because the opposing army was too close. Because Scipio had ordered his troops to form for battle closer to the Carthaginian camp.

  For the next few hours, Scipio held back his infantry behind the skirmishing light troops and thus amplified the effect of the missed breakfast on his enemy. When he finally decided to attack, the light troops retreated through the space between the maniples to position themselves behind the legions on the wings; then the main advance began. With his wings advancing at a faster pace than the Iberians in his center, Scipio formed a concave or reverse Cannae, battle line. Furthermore, the Roman general expanded his wings by ordering the light troops to the flanks of the legionaries, and the cavalry , thus enveloping the whole Carthaginian line on both sides.  Still refusing his center, Scipio’s legions, light troops, and cavalry attacked the half-trained Iberians on the Carthaginian wings from front, flank, and rear respectively. The Carthaginian center was helpless to reinforce its wings with the threat of the Iberian force that was looming large in the near distance but not attacking.

  With the inevitable destruction of its wings, the Carthaginian center was further demoralized and confused by the trampling by their own maddened elephants, which were being driven towards the center by the Roman cavalry attacking the flanks. Combined with hunger and fatigue, the Carthaginians started to withdraw, at first in good order.

However, as Scipio now pressed his advantage by ordering his Iberian center into battle, the Carthaginians crumbled, and a sudden downpour, which brought a hold to all actions on the field, and enabled the remaining Carthaginians to seek refuge in their camp, only averted a massacre that might have rivaled the one in Cannae.

 After Ilipa although temporarily safe in their camp, the Carthaginians were not able to rest. Facing the inevitable Roman attack the next morning, they were obliged to strengthen their defenses. Nevertheless, as more and more Iberian mercenaries deserted the Carthaginians as night drew forward, Hasdrubal tried to slip away with his remaining men in darkness.

  Scipio immediately ordered a pursuit. Led by the cavalry, the whole Roman army was hot on Hasdrubal’s tail. When the Romans finally caught up with the Carthaginian host, the butchery began. Hasdrubal had only 6,000 men, who then fled onto a mountaintop without any water supply. This remnant of the Carthaginian army surrendered a short time later, but not before Hasdrubal and Mago had made good their escape.  This put an end of Carthage’s hold on Iberia (Spain).

  After his final subjugation of Carthaginian Iberia and revenge upon the Iberian chieftains, whose betrayal had led to the death of his father and uncle, Cornelius Scipio Africanus  returned to Rome.  In 205 BCE, he was elected as consul by a unanimous nomination, and with the Scipiones and their allies now in power, he would have the control of Sicily as proconsul, from where he intended to invade Carthage.